For the purposes of this project, strategic culture is defined as: Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.
is under constant threat of annihilation. Thus, Israel must be actively defended by all the resources the state can bring to bear, particularly its citizenry and technological base, which must be organized into qualitatively superior military forces. Because its resources are limited and it lacks strategic depth, Israel must rely on deterrence, backed by a rapid mobilization capability, and be prepared to act preemptively should deterrence seem to be eroding. In any event, Israel must immediately "carry the fight" to the enemy's territory to achieve a quick victory and spare the Israeli home front.
To hedge against conventional military defeat, international isolation, and attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Israel must have its own WMD options, particularly a nuclear weapons capability. To avoid alienating Israel's international supporters and further enflaming Arab enmity, that capability should remain officially unacknowledged for as long as possible. Finally, Israel must further reinforce a perception of national inviolability by minimizing the impact of terrorism on Israeli society, while simultaneously preserving Jewish norms of ethical conduct in war.
A variety of factors, such as disillusionment with the performance of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), particularly since 1973, and the changing complexion of Israeli society have given rise to competing subcultures, as detailed below. With areas of overlap as well as divergence, these sub-groupings add complexity and dynamism to Israeli strategic culture.
Origins of the "Shared Narrative"
A full recounting of the Jewish saga is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it is necessary to highlight the major events and circumstances that haven given rise to Israel's distinctive strategic culture. To begin, it bears recalling the ancient roots of Judaism.
According to Hebrew mythology, around 1200 BC, the Israelite tribes under the leadership of Joshua conquered part of the land of Canaan. This nascent, monotheistic Jewish civilization was built up under the reign of King David. Legend has it that God had promised this land, which later became known as Palestine, to the Jewish people. Under David, bitter battles were fought over the so-called "promised land," resulting in the annihilation of the Philistines residing there. In 587 BC, King Nebuchadnezzar conquered Judea and deported much of its population to Babylon. Judea was later re-established, only to be destroyed again, this time by the Romans, in AD 70. It was during this era that a group of Jewish zealots took refuge in Masada. Legend holds that rather than submit to Roman slavery, these Jews committed mass suicide-a heroic, "freedom fighter" myth that is propagated to this day, for example, in the indoctrination of IDF soldiers.
1 Forced exile, the Diaspora, resulted in four-fifths of the Jewish world population residing in Eastern Europe by the beginning of the 19 th century, although a "culture of return" to the Holy Land had long since taken root.
Anti-Semitic persecutions, or pogroms, swept through the Russian empire in 1881-1882, triggering Jewish immigration to America and, to a lesser extent, "Zion," the biblical name of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. The so-called Zionist movement, led by these Ashkenazi or
Occidental Jews, gathered momentum in the late-1890s, raising funds, purchasing land in Palestine, and then settling it. Socialist and communist ideas combined with nationalist goals, resulting in a Zionist strategy to establish an exclusively Jewish communal society that would later become the basis for a state. To further this goal, underground Zionist militias were set up to protect Jewish settlements from the growing frictions with the local Palestinian community.
These activities set the stage for a culture of secrecy and militarism in the eventual Israeli state. 
Characteristics of Israel's Strategic Culture

Keepers of Strategic Culture
Israel's strategic culture has been carefully crafted over the past six decades. The primary vehicles for doing so have been state institutions. Among these, the IDF is paramount.
The IDF has various means at its disposal to indoctrinate Israeli Jews, particularly recent immigrants, into the dominant security culture. Mainly, this is accomplished through universal should become an all-volunteer force.
Strategic Subcultures
Baruch Kimmerling, a scholar representing the "third wave" of Israeli sociologists, has identified three "orientations" within Israeli society, essentially strategic cultures that have some commonality in strategic beliefs, as well as important differences. These are the "security orientation," the "conflict orientation," and the "settlement" or "peace orientation." Each is briefly summarized below (see also Figure 1 ).
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The "security orientation" believes that Israel is locked in a battle for survival with its Arab neighbors, and that a major Israeli military defeat would mean annihilation of Israeli Jews. The primary means to prevent this is absolute and permanent Israeli military superiority in the region.
It is the supreme duty of every member of Israeli society to do his or her utmost in military service to the state. The authority of the state to determine the nature of that military service is absolute. However, it is not unconditional, as the state is expected to not abuse this readiness for self-sacrifice and to use the military only for what are believed to be matters of survival.
The security orientation is said to be highly heterogeneous and the political culture of most mainstream social groups. Politically, this orientation channels its votes to the two largest parties, Likud and Labor.
The "conflict orientation" assumes that the Jewish-Arab conflict is just another incarnation of historic anti-Semitism. Given the current geopolitical situation, no peaceful settlement with Israel's neighbors is possible in the foreseeable future. Apparently influenced by realist thought, this group believes that power and military strength are the only factors that matter in relations between different national, ethnic, or religious groups. Periodic wars are inevitable and must be won. All other collective or private goals are subordinate to this.
The "conflict orientation" has a very strong, indeed moral and sacred, connection to the Land of Israel and insists that the state must hold to as much of this territory as possible. This grouping is highly ethnocentric in nature and gives priority to Hebrew or Halachic law over democratic and legal institutions and practices. Settlers in the occupied territories of the West Bank form the nucleus of this orientation.
The "peace orientation" is diametrically opposed to the "conflict orientation. Despite the differences among these three cultures, there are important similarities. They all perceive a real threat to the survival of Israel as a Jewish settler society. They also acknowledge that Israeli military might is central to that survival. Indeed, peace-oriented advocates of returning the occupied territories are ardent supporters of Israel's nuclear capability as the ultimate protector of a smaller Israeli state. This support for Israel's nuclear capability is not universal, however. A small minority of right-wingers, who believe that territorial depth is the key to Israeli security, are suspicious of the nuclear program precisely because it undermines the rationale for holding on to the occupied territories. Finally, all three orientations believe that Israeli Arabs have virtually no role in the state security apparatus or in conflict resolution.
Kimmerling contends that these three orientations cut across most of the cultures comprising Israeli society writ large, such as the Ashkenazi, traditional Mizrahim (Oriental Jews), "national religious" (a euphemism for religious fundamentalists), Orthodox religious, and new Russian immigrants.
Strategic Culture in Transition
Of these three groupings, the "security orientation" has effectively provided the basis of Israeli strategic culture since the inception of the Jewish state. The dominance of this culture has been eroded, however, since 1973 as a result of IDF wartime and training mishaps, demographic and generational changes, shifts in the role of the media and academia, the rise of individualism, and the emergence of religious nationalism. Indeed, such changes are responsible for the very emergence of the "conflict" and "peace" strategic sub-cultures. 5 There remains one important bastion of press deference, however: Israel's nuclear capability (as described below).
For its part, academia spawned a so-called "third wave" of sociologists more inclined to critically assess the relationship between the Israeli military and civil society than its predecessors. Second-wave sociologists defend their work, in part, by acknowledging that over time, they have too have increasingly questioned many of the assumptions behind Israel's national security ethos.
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Other changes in Israeli society have challenged the traditional consensus on strategic culture. The influx of 800,000 Russian immigrants following the demise of the Soviet Union posed a major challenge of absorption, assimilation, and preservation of national identity. Here again, the IDF has served as the nation's melting pot, helping to make self-evident to the new immigrants the sense of constant threat and need for military sacrifice on behalf of the Israeli state. Yet, because this pool of manpower has become so large, the IDF cannot absorb it. This has led to modifications in IDF conscription and reserve duty policy and has diluted the concept that all Israelis must make sacrifices in the name of national security. Minister Yitzhak Rabin to reach a political settlement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization at Oslo. analysts is that, whereas other groups were motivated to serve in the IDF mainly because they accepted the dominant ethos of sacrifice in the name of national security, religious soldiers appear to be largely motivated by hatred of Arabs and a desire for revenge on them. This could produce a radical change in the value system of the IDF's senior officer ranks in the next few years. 10 Already by 1998, the first national religious officer was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, with a seat on the IDF General Staff.
Rabbis declared that no government had the right to give away "God's land" and that it was "God's will" that soldiers not obey the orders to remove Israeli settlers. In the end, only about 30 officers and soldiers out of the 11,000 involved in the disengagement refused to carry out the south Lebanon were seen as having invited these attacks, support for the "peace" sub-culture could be significantly reduced, to the benefit of the "securitist" and "conflict" orientations.
Moreover, achievement in battle during this latest conflict could further the careers of religious soldiers, thereby advancing within the IDF officer corps and perhaps the broader national security establishment the "conflict" sub-culture's influence over national policy. By the fall of 2006, many Israelis had indeed concluded that the policy of withdrawal from occupied territory had been a mistake, and the movement to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank was experiencing a revival. 12 As for the performance of the IDF, it was clear to Israelis that their military strategy and force posture, which relied heavily upon high-tech stand-off attacks by the air force to reduce the exposure of Israeli ground forces, failed the test of battle against an enemy like Hezbollah. 13 Further soul-searching on fundamental Israeli security issues can be expected in the wake of the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah.
Threat Perception
At the heart of Israeli strategic culture is an immutable threat perception, the huge demographic disparity vis-à-vis the Arab (and increasingly pan-Muslim) world. Israeli political and military thought sub-divides this macro threat into a series of concentric circles that are roughly geographic in nature (see Figure 2 ). 14 The most proximate threat is the "Palestinian The Necessity of Violence and Laws of War
As noted above, the state, acting through the IDF system of universal conscription and reserve duty, has socially constructed a sense of imminent threat of attack bordering on fatalism. Because war is a strictly negative phenomenon in Judaism, the Israelis have developed a prism that transfers responsibility for war to the party that initiates it. In essence, Israeli Jews have embraced as part of their strategic culture the biblical distinction between wars that are forced upon the state (i.e., "obligatory") and those that are undertaken at the discretion of the ruler (i.e., "optional"). Ethically, the former are considered "just" wars that require full public support, while the latter lack consensus and, by extension, moral clarity. Journal, vol. 3, no. 4, Fall 1986, 47-50. duality is expressed as "no choice war" vs. "war by choice." Generally, Israelis regard all of their wars to date as being "no choice," with the exception of the 1982 and 2006 warsin Lebanon.
Israeli scholars draw a more nuanced distinction, encompassing "defensive" wars, where the enemy "fires the first shot;" "preventive" wars, which are launched to destroy the potential threat of the enemy; and "preemptive" wars, where strikes are initiated in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression. Accordingly, they characterize the wars of 1948, 1969-70, and 1973 as purely defensive; the 1956 war as preventive; and the 1967 war as preemptive.
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The 1982 invasion of Lebanon sparked a far-reaching national debate in Israel. Political and military leaders at the time tried unsuccessfully to justify the conflict as a no-choice war.
Their subsequent efforts to change the well-understood national political terminology of conflict (by introducing the phrase "war by choice") likewise failed, and as the goals of the operation expanded, and Israeli casualties mounted, initial public support for the war dissipated.
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Other biblical teachings are said to set the parameters for Israeli conduct in war. Among these is the stipulation to seek peace before resorting to war. This is typically equated with the ten-day "waiting period" between Israel's mobilization in 1967, in response to the massing of Among these values is the concept of "purity of arms," which traces back to the origins of the IDF. According to this "value":
The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only for the purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain their humanity even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property. 47-48. committed by IDF officers and soldiers, particularly those of the elite "Mistarvim" (special hit units), during the Intifada.
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More recently, a team of Israeli professors, commanders, and former judges developed a code of conduct to address the specific challenges of low-intensity warfare. Regular and reserve IDF units are taught the following eleven rules of conduct, which supplement the military's "spirit" and "values":
• Military action can only be taken against military targets.
• The use of force must be proportional.
• Soldiers may only use weaponry they were issued by the IDF.
• Anyone who surrenders cannot be attacked.
• Only those who are properly trained can interrogate prisoners.
• Soldiers must accord dignity and respect to the Palestinian population and those arrested.
• Soldiers must give appropriate medical care, when conditions allow, to oneself and one's enemy.
• Pillaging is absolutely and totally illegal.
• Soldiers must show proper respect for religious and cultural sites and artifacts.
• Soldiers must protect international aid workers, including their property and vehicles.
• Soldiers must report all violations of this code.
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As another indicator of Israel's desire to adhere to humane standards of war, by 1994, the Jewish state joined the international moratorium on the sale of anti-personnel mines. The following year, it signed two of the three protocols of the international treaty banning the use of inhumane conventional weapons. These protocols limit the use of landmines, as well as antipersonnel weapons that rely on fragments that are too small to be detected by x-ray, thus impeding medical treatment. fought by various militias cobbled together into the nascent IDF. That force structure was heavily depleted as a result of casualties, demobilization, and purges designed to remove extremists from its ranks. The IDF then faced a choice of moving to a model based on small elite units or a "people's army." Facing an influx of immigrants, Israel opted for the latter with the intent of using military service as the chief means of molding the immigrants into ideal Israeli citizens committed to self-sacrifice on behalf of the state. 30 As noted, this has been accomplished through the policy of universal conscription and reserve duty.
By design, the IDF thus relies upon a small cadre of professional officers (historically, less than 10 percent of the total force), a conscript base (105,000 troops in 2006), and a larger manpower reserve (exceeding 500,000). The standing conscript force is intended to defend
Israel against a major attack for 24-36 hours, by which point, the reserves will be fully mobilized, enabling the IDF to conduct strategic counter-attacks into enemy territory.
In the 1980s, the IDF senior command under Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan made a farreaching decision to organize Israeli settlers in the occupied territories into special reservist units under the "area defense" system. In so doing, he intentionally institutionalized a close link between the religiously-inspired settlers, who believe in the sanctity of Israeli land, and the IDF in the hopes of thwarting any future efforts to relinquish the occupied territories. disaster. This delay and the inherent ambiguity in the law underscore the degree of informality and fluidity that lies at the heart of Israeli national security decision-making. 30 Kimmerling, "The Social Construction of Israel's National Security," 224. 
Role of Strategic Culture in Shaping Israeli Doctrine and Operations
The development of Israeli military doctrine and its execution in war, including limitations thereon, provide numerous examples of how strategic culture helps to determine the appropriate means and ends of achieving security. For example, Israel's lack of strategic depth and limited resources has historically precluded the adoption of defensive war-fighting strategies.
Indeed, the very high social and economic cost of full mobilization, which puts virtually the entire male population under arms, signifies that war is all but inevitable. Such was Israel's dilemma in 1967. It had perceived Egypt's troop mobilization and closure of the Straits of Tiran as clear signs that deterrence was eroding and that another Arab-Israeli war would be needed to re-establish it. 36 The government decided that it could not sustain the IDF's mobilization beyond 10 days, and so the decision was made to launch a pre-emptive attack. Israel's inability to remain mobilized for extended periods without suffering major economic damage likewise compelled the Jewish state to escalate its strikes against Egypt in 1970 in order to break Cairo's year-long attempt to ensnare Israel in a war of attrition.
The stunning military success of the 1967 war was seen by many Israelis as divine intervention that reinforced their self-identity as "God's chosen people." 37 However, it was not matched by political foresight that could secure the peace, since the newly acquired territory carried with it an enormous and hostile Arab population. Given the collective's own experience with genocide, Jewish leaders could not bring themselves to conduct an ethnic cleansing of that magnitude. 38 Nor, could they accept a bi-national state, which would deprive the Jewish state of its raison d'etre. Hence, core ethical beliefs and identities that transcend partisan politics have prevented Israel from de jure annexation of the occupied territories.
The Jewish military ethos is also evident in Israel's response to the 1972 massacre in Munich, Germany of its Olympic athletes at the hands of the "Black September" Palestinian terrorist group. In essence, Prime Minister Golda Meir formed a secret committee that authorized the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, to hunt down and kill Black September members involved directly or indirectly in the massacre. General Aharon Yariv, who oversaw 36 Kimmerling, "The Social Construction of Israel's National Security," 229. 37 Ibid., 231. 38 Kimmerling contends that Israel, in effect, conducted an ethnic cleansing of the territory it conquered during the 1948 war, turning some 700,000-900,000 Palestinians into refugees. The Invention and Decline of Israeliness, 40. what became known as "Operation Wrath of God," echoed the "no-choice" theme and other biblical sources of Israeli strategic culture when he explained the rationale behind the decision:
We had no choice. We had to make them stop, and there was no other way ... we are not very proud about it. But it was a question of sheer necessity. We went back to the old biblical rule of an eye for an eye...
39
Other interpretations of what constitutes appropriate means of achieving security can be found in the IDF's handling of the 1987 Intifada. As noted above, the IDF decided that rather than risk a broader break-down in its mobilization capability-the key to Israel's overall military power and national integrity, it would accept constraints on its operations and exempt reservists from operations to suppress the Intifada. Eventually, the IDF command publicly acknowledged that it could not engage in the types of operations needed to eliminate the Intifada without violating societal norms. In essence, IDF Chief of Staff Dan Shomron declared that there was no acceptable military solution to the uprising and that it had to be resolved politically. While being the case. Strategic culture has helped shaped this and other aspects of Israel's attitudes and policies governing WMD.
The historical legacy of the Holocaust and Arab refusal to accept the Jewish state despite its victory in 1948 weighed heavily on Ben-Gurion's mind. Utmost was his fear that a future unified Arab attack-the inevitable "next round"-would lead to the destruction of Israel. BenGurion and a very small circle of advisors immediately grasped that the only way to avert another Holocaust would be to attain the capability to inflict one. This "never again" and "no choice" mentality is evident in a private letter of Ernst Bergmann who, as the first director of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission, played a key role in helping Israel achieve its nuclear goals:
There is no person in this country who does not fear nuclear war and there is no man in this country who does not hope that, despite it all, logic will rule in the world of tomorrow. But we are not permitted to exchange precise knowledge and realistic evaluations for hopes and illusions. I cannot forget that the Holocaust came on the Jewish people by surprise. The Jewish people cannot allow themselves such an illusion for the second time.
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It is the perceived lessons of the Holocaust that give full meaning to Ben-Gurion's pursuit of not just nuclear weapons but also chemical weapons. With not just the Israeli state hanging in the balance but also the fate of the Jewish people, the moral ironies of pursuing WMD, including "poison gas," 43 were subsumed by the "no-choice" rationale.
Other facets of Israel's strategic culture influenced the path by which the Jewish state pursued nuclear weapons. As Israel's pre-eminent "founding father," Ben-Gurion established decision-making patterns that endure to this day. Chief among them is the informality and secrecy that govern military decision-making in general, and nuclear decision-making in particular. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the nuclear project, Ben-Gurion kept the number of personnel "in the loop" to an absolute minimum. To underscore, he did not:
• Bring the decision to construct the Dimona reactor before the Cabinet,
• Formally consult with IDF leaders besides Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan,
• Specifically mention or leave a written record of the nuclear project by name,
• Identify the project in the national budget, or rely solely on state funds to pay for it.
42 Ibid., 16. 43 Ibid., 48-49. The nature of that sensitivity stemmed from a variety of factors including: debate amongst Israel's scientific cadre that it could build such a reactor on its own; France's own reluctance to make known its unprecedented negotiations and subsequent agreement with Israel to help build the reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility; and, concern that if Dimona was discovered prematurely, the Arabs would launch a preventive war. This issue became even more sensitive when U.S. intelligence uncovered the project between 1958-1960, and particularly the Kennedy Administration made known to Ben-Gurion and his successors that the United Statesa potentially major benefactor-was opposed to Israeli nuclear proliferation.
Israeli politicians and the public at large helped solidify this culture of informality and secrecy governing nuclear affairs. 44 Both communities accepted the notion that Israeli national security would be compromised by a public discourse on the subject. Alternative but limited consultative arrangements were devised for select lawmakers, and the combination of self-and military-censorship helped ensure that only a sterile and inconsequential public debate took place. Indeed, while Israeli media, academics, and the public at large have become more critical of the national security establishment over the years, the nuclear issue remains perhaps the last area of tacit agreement on the need to maintain pubic silence.
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Behind the scenes in 1962, the real debate was taking place between two schools of military thought as to the posture Israel should adopt now that Dimona was nearing completion, namely, should Israel shift its defense posture from conventional to nuclear forces. 46 A small group of protagonists from each school met with Ben-Gurion to make their respective cases.
According to accounts from the participants, their debate reflected many of the functional issues faced by Western powers at the time. Among these was the argument that nuclear weapons could not substitute for conventional forces, and if the former were funded at the expense of the latter, a weakened conventional defense might actually invite (Arab) attack. Notably, this "conventionalist" school asserted that Israeli deployment of nuclear weapons would only precipitate Arab nuclearization, to Israel's overall detriment. By the same token, conventional force proponents did not rule out the need for a nuclear "bomb in the basement" that could be quickly brought to bear if needed. In the end, Ben-Gurion appears to have concluded it would be unwise to put all of the IDF's "eggs in the nuclear basket." In the realist paradigm, Israel's pioneering and far-reaching decision not to acknowledge openly its possession of nuclear weapons represented a rare case of a state constraining its military capability in explicit recognition of the so-called "security dilemma"-wherein increasing one's own security can bring about greater instability as the opponent builds up its own arms in response.
"Nuclear Opacity" and Deterrence
Still, for Israel to derive any hoped-for deterrent effect from the possession of a "bomb in the basement," it had to strike a balance between alluding to this capability without provoking a counter-productive Arab response. Here, Israel has managed to achieve what has been described as "nuclear opacity"-the ability to influence other nation's perceptions in the absence of official acknowledgement of nuclear weapons possession and with only circumstantial evidence that such weapons exist. 47 It has done so using a skillfully devising declaratory policy that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East"-a construct Shimon
Peres apparently improvised during an impromptu private talk with the President Kennedy in early 1963, but which has become Israel's nuclear mantra ever since. 48 The to attack-along with a sense of abandonment by Israel's erstwhile allies in the West. It could also arise from indicators that the enemy was about to use WMD against Israel. This suggests the possibility of last-resort escalation to shock the enemy into a cease-fire and nuclear preemption, respectively.
• In retaliation for WMD use against Israel. Given Israel's small size and the concentration of its population, it has been characterized by some analysts, and ominously by Iran, 51 as a "one-bomb state"-able to be destroyed with a single nuclear explosion. In such an event,
Israeli behavior might once again be driven by biblical notions of vengeance.
Metaphorically, this has been expressed as the "Samson Option," 52 and translates into a determination by Israelis to "take down" with them as many Muslims as possible. Such a desire would likely entail measures to ensure that Israeli nuclear forces could survive a nuclear attack in such numbers, and with adequate command and control arrangements, as to strike the major population centers of the Arab states and the "outer-rim" of Iran and
Pakistan, if necessary.
Non-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
Concerns about the acquisition of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, by its enemies have compelled the Jewish state to devise strategies to forestall that event. Essentially, the choices lay in two areas: efforts to build norms against acquisition of WMD (i.e., nonproliferation) and active measures to disrupt physically such acquisition (i.e., counterproliferation). Of these, Israel has clearly favored the latter. This strike, which is widely acknowledged as pushing back Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons timetable by a decade-before the Iraqi program was eventually ended by US and UN actions-laid the basis for the so-called Begin Doctrine, which asserted that, "under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will defend Israel's citizens, in time, with all the means at our disposal." 56 In reality,
Israeli considerations of preemptive counter-proliferation are more nuanced and include such criteria as the magnitude and severity of the threat, the feasibility of a military strike, and the domestic and international costs of the action.
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Nonetheless, these issues have taken on greater saliency with the convergence of a number of troubling developments that touch on fundamental tenets of Israel's strategic culture, namely, the sudden emergence of an extremist Iranian president in 2005, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, who has publicly denied that the Holocaust ever happened and has called for 
